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In	 this	 paper	we	 seek	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 predictability	 of	 stock	market	 returns	 and	 explain	 the	
nature	of	this	return	predictability.	To	this	end,	we	further	develop	the	news‐driven	analytic	model	
of	the	stock	market	derived	in	Gusev	et	al.	(2015).	This	enables	us	to	capture	market	dynamics	at	
various	 timescales	 and	 shed	 light	 on	 mechanisms	 underlying	 certain	 market	 behaviors	 such	 as	
transitions	 between	 bull‐	 and	 bear	 markets	 and	 the	 self‐similar	 behavior	 of	 price	 changes.	 We	
investigate	the	model	and	show	that	 the	market	 is	nearly	efficient	on	timescales	shorter	than	one	
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success	 is	 therefore	 reliant	on	 the	 speed	and	precision	with	which	 information	 retrieval	 and	 text	





sign	 of	 sentiment	 assigned	 to	 a	 news	 item	 and	 its	 size	 on	 price	 sensitivity	 –	 each	 still	 being	 a	
formidable	 task.	 As	 with	 any	 other	 short‐term	 trading	 strategy,	 the	 downside	 here	 is	 a	 limited	
capacity	 and	high,	 turnover‐driven	 costs.	 Furthermore,	 should	 successful	 strategies	 eventually	 be	
developed	 –	 so	 far	 results	 have	 been	mixed	 to	 the	 best	 of	 our	 knowledge	 –	 competition	 in	 this	











At	 first	 glance,	 the	 answer	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 firm	 “yes”.	 Indeed,	 while	 it	 appears	 reasonable	 to	










2	There	 is	a	 large	body	of	research	 that	examines,	 typically	applying	regression	methods,	 the	predictive	
power	of	observable	variables,	such	as	the	dividend	yield	and	many	others;	see,	for	example,	Fama	and	French	
(1988,	1989),	Campbell	 and	Shiller	 (1988a,b),	Baker	and	Wurgler	 (2000),	Campbell	and	Thompson	 (2008),	
Cochrane	(2008).	However,	the	evidence	for	return	prediction	remains	inconclusive:	e.g.	Ferson	et	al.	(2003,	
2008),	 Goyal	 and	 Welch	 (2003,	 2008).	 The	 model	 of	 stock	 market	 dynamics	 that	 we	 develop	 here	 is	
fundamentally	nonlinear,	indicating	that	causal	relations	among	the	variables	are	substantially	more	complex	
than	regression	dependence.	It	follows	that	the	standard	approach	to	return	prediction,	based	on	regression	
methods,	 may	 be	 ill‐suited	 to	 capture	 this	 predictability;	 e.g.	 Novy‐Marx	 (2014)	 vividly	 pointed	 out	 this	
limitation	by	extending	stock	market	predictive	regressions	to	a	number	of	rather	implausible	variables,	such	
as	sunspot	activity	and	planetary	motion	among	others.	Gusev	et	al.	(2015)	proposed	an	alternative	approach	
that	combines,	 analogous	 to	weather	 forecasting,	 theoretical	models	with	empirical	data.	The	present	work	











we	 must	 apply	 a	 different	 framework	 for	 return	 prediction.	 While	 the	 short‐term	 prediction	
requires	fast	detection	of	the	news	releases	that	may	provoke	material	changes	 in	price,	 the	 long‐
term	prediction,	on	 the	contrary,	can	only	be	based	on	 the	regularity	of	 the	system’s	behavior.	 In	
other	words,	we	must	develop	a	dynamic	model	that	correctly	describes	interaction	between	news	
and	price.	Then,	provided	the	model	admits	non‐stochastic	solutions,	it	would	be	sufficient	to	know	
the	market	position	 in	 the	news‐price	reference	 frame	 to	 forecast	 return	by	 following	 the	market	
evolution	path	provided	by	the	model.			







4	A	 family	 of	 models,	 named	 after	 Ising	 (1925),	 developed	 originally	 to	 explain	 the	 phenomenon	 of	




interacting	 agents:	 investors,	who	 invest	 or	 divest	 according	 to	 their	 opinions,	 and	 analysts,	who	
interpret	 news,	 form	 opinions	 and	 channel	 them	 to	 investors.5	To	 derive	 the	model	 equations	 in	
analytic	form	and	facilitate	its	study,	it	was	assumed	that	investors	made	up	a	homogeneous	group	
in	which	any	two	market	participants	interacted	identically.	Despite	this	and	other	simplifications,	
the	 model	 reproduced	 the	 price	 path	 and	 return	 distribution	 of	 the	 S&P	 500	 Index	 within	
reasonable	tolerance.	Based	on	these	results,	 the	authors	suggested	that	stock	market	returns	are	
predictable,	but	did	not	conduct	tests	of	this	predictability.	








2009;	 Slanina,	 2014;	 Sornette,	 2014).	We	 take	 note	 of	 two	 recent	works	 that	 share	 common	 ground	with	
Gusev	 et	 al.	 (2015).	 First,	 Franke	 (2014),	 referencing	 Lux’s	 (1995)	 analytic	 stock	market	model,	 studied	 a	
generic	sentiment‐driven	economic	model	with	feedback,	which	has	some	features	similar	to	those	found	in	
Gusev	 et	 al.	 (2015).	 Second,	 Carro	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 investigated	 the	 influence	 of	 exogenous	 information	 on	
endogenous	sentiment	dynamics	in	the	stock	market,	which	is	also	a	central	theme	in	Gusev	et	al.	(2015).	
5	This	 approach	 contrasts	 with	 that	 of	 the	 established	 agent‐based	 financial	 models,	 where	 market	








strategies.	 Section	 4	 further	 discusses	 the	 nature	 of	 return	 predictability.	 Section	 5	 provides	 a	
summary	of	conclusions.	
1.	Models	




The	model	 of	 stock	market	 dynamics	 in	Gusev	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 is	 formulated	 as	 a	 dynamical	 system	
governing	 the	 evolution	 of	 three	 independent	 variables:	market	 price	݌,	 investor	 sentiment	ݏ	and	
information	 flow	݄.	 It	was	obtained	by	defining,	based	on	observed	behaviors,	 interactions	among	
agents	 at	 a	 micro	 level	 and	 applying	 methods	 from	 statistical	 mechanics	 to	 produce	 dynamic	
equations	for	averaged	variables	at	a	macro	level.	Before	exploring	the	equations,	it	may	be	helpful	
to	explain	the	proper	context	in	which	sentiment	and	information	are	used	in	the	model.	
Investor	 sentiment	 is	 defined	 as	 a	 summary	 view	 on	 future	 market	 performance,	 averaged	







Information	 flow	 considered	 in	 the	model	 as	 relevant	 comprises	 publicly	 expressed	 opinions	
about	 the	direction	of	anticipated	market	movement.	 It	 is	quantified	similarly	 to	sentiment	as	 the	
ratio	of	the	number	of	news	items	with	positive	expectations	minus	the	number	of	news	items	with	
negative	expectations	over	the	total	number	of	news	items	concerning	the	market.	Like	sentiment,	
information	݄	is	 bounded	 between	 ‐1	 and	 1.	 The	 fact	 that	݄	can	 be	 readily	 measured	 allows	 the	
model	to	be	empirically	verified.6,7	
																																																													
6	Gusev	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 proposed	 that	 information	݄,	 referred	 to	 as	 “direct	 information”,	 can	 effectively	
influence	 investors’	view.	That	paper	provided	a	 rule‐based	parsing	methodology	 for	measuring	݄	based	on	
marketing	 research	 techniques,	 essentially	 treating	 each	 news	 item	 as	 if	 it	 were	 a	 “sales	 pitch”	 aimed	 at	
investors	to	buy	or	sell	the	market.	In	practice,	as	news	about	current	and	recent	market	movements	can	also	













݌ሶ ൌ ܽଵݏሶ ൅ ܽଶሺݏ െ ݏ∗ሻ,																																																																																																																																															ሺ1ܽሻ	
߬௦ݏሶ ൌ െݏ ൅ tanhሺߚଵݏ ൅ ߚଶ݄ሻ,																																																																																																																																	ሺ1ܾሻ	









information	 flow	 on	 investors	 via	 the	 term	ߚଶ݄	and	 the	 interaction	 among	 investors	 via	 the	 term	
ߚଵݏ,	 where	߬௦	is	 the	 characteristic	 time	 of	 sentiment	 variation	 and	ߚଵ	determines	 the	 relative	
importance	of	the	herding	behavior	and	the	random	behavior	of	investors.	Information	flow	acts	as	
																																																													
8	Gusev	et	 al.	 (2015)	 (Eq.	13,	 Fig.	 12).	The	dot	denotes	 the	derivative	with	 respect	 to	 time.	Parameters	






rest	at	a	nonzero	value	for	ߚଵ ൐ 1	(ordered	state)	or	at	zero	for	ߚଵ ൏ 1	(disordered	state).			
The	third	equation	states	 that	 the	change	 in	 information	 flow	 is	caused	by	exogenous	news	ߦ௧	
and	news	about	price	changes	݌ሶ ,	with	߬௛	being	the	characteristic	response	time.9		
Equations	 (1)	 form	a	 three‐dimensional	 nonlinear	dynamical	 system.	Each	point	 in	 the	phase	






all‐to‐all	 interaction	 pattern	 among	 agents.10	In	 reality,	 interaction	 among	 investors	 is	 hardly	 so	
simple.	 The	 utilization	 of	 more	 sophisticated	 patterns	 of	 interaction	 in	 the	 Ising‐type	 models	 is	
known	 to	 cause	 the	 emergence	 of	 heterogeneous	 structures	 –	 i.e.	 in	 the	 present	 case,	 clusters	 of	
investors	with	co‐aligned	sentiments.	Because	the	size	of	a	cluster	determines	 its	reaction	time	to	
incoming	 information,	 this	heterogeneity	can	generate	diverse	dynamics	 involving	 interactions	on	








that	 determines	 the	 average	 investor	 behavior	 evolving	 within	 a	 single	 timeframe	߬௦11.	 Thus,	




We	wish	 to	 replace	 the	 above‐described	 framework,	where	 each	 investor	 interacts	with	 all	 other	
investors	 with	 the	 same	 strength,	 by	 a	 framework	 with	 a	 more	 realistic	 interaction	 pattern.	











within	 the	 framework	 of	 percolation	 theory	 leading	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 clusters	 of	 investors	with	 shared	





information,	 which	 we	 can	 assume	 proportional	 to	 the	 investment	 time	 horizon.	 It	 is	 therefore	
sensible	to	select	the	investment	horizon	as	the	attribute	whereby	variability	is	introduced	into	the	
model.	 Thus,	we	wish	 to	modify	model	 (1)	 by	 populating	 it	with	 the	 investors	 that	 have	 various	
investment	horizons.13	
Next,	 we	 must	 make	 assumptions	 on	 how	 these	 investors	 would	 interact.	 Presumably,	 any	
organization,	whether	in	the	investment	industry	or	elsewhere,	should	tend	to	connect	best	with	its	
peers,	 owing	 to	 shared	 professional	 interests.	 For	 example,	 long‐term	 investors,	 such	 as	 pension	
plans,	 have	 little	 in	 common	 with	 wealth	 management	 companies	 oriented	 toward	 mid‐term	
performance	and	even	less	so	with	the	day‐trading	community.	Each	of	these	investment	industry	
segments	 maintains	 its	 own	 professional	 publications,	 conferences,	 seminars,	 awards	 and	 other	
platforms	for	discourse	 that	promote	networking	and	 interaction.	Therefore,	we	can	suppose	 that	
interaction	 within	 the	 networks	 of	 peers,	 whom	 we	 propose	 to	 identify	 with	 respect	 to	 the	
investment	horizon,	is	more	efficient	than	across	them.		
We	have	thus	arrived	at	a	framework	where	investors	with	similar	horizons	form	peer	networks	
or	groups	within	which	 they	 interact	efficiently,	but	have	 little	 interaction	externally,	 at	 the	 same	
time	being	 impacted	 in	equal	measure	by	 information	flow	݄.	 In	the	 limiting	case,	we	can	assume,	








interaction	across	 these	groups.	This	enables	us	 to	 apply	 equations	 (1b,c)	 to	describe	 the	market	
with	ܰ	participating	peer	groups	as	follows:	
߬௜ݏሶ௜ ൌ െݏ௜ ൅ tanhሺߚଵݏ௜ ൅ ߚଶ݄ሻ,						݅ ൌ 1, 2, … ,ܰ,																																																																																													ሺ2ܽሻ	
߬௛ ሶ݄ ൌ െ݄ ൅ tanhሺߢଵ݌ሶ ൅ ߢଶߦ௧ሻ,																																																																																																																														ሺ2ܾሻ	
where	ݏ௜	is	 the	 average	 sentiment	 of	 the	݅‐th	 group,	 which	 having	 been	 normalized	 by	 the	 total	
number	of	 investors	 in	 the	group	takes	values	between	 ‐1	and	1,	and	߬௜	is	 its	 investment	horizon.	
Note	 that	 both	 the	 “herding”	 parameter	ߚଵ	and	 the	 constant	ߚଶ,	 which	 determines	 sensitivity	 to	
information	flow,	are	assumed	to	be	in	the	leading	order	uniform	across	the	groups.			
Next,	 we	 must	 adapt	 equation	 (1a).	 Its	 derivation	 in	 Gusev	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 was	 based	 on	 the	
observation	that	capital	flows	in	the	market	are	caused	differently	on	different	timescales,	namely	






linearly	 with	 time,	 we	 arrive	 at	ܿ௜~߬௜,	݀ܿ௜~߬௜݀ݏ௜	and	 ሶܿ௜~߬௜ݏሶ௜	at	ݐ ≪ ߬௜.	 Similarly,	 we	 obtain	 that	
ሶܿ௜~߬௜ሺݏ௜ െ ݏ∗௜ሻ	at	ݐ ≫ ߬௜.		
	We	superpose	the	asymptotic	relations	 ሶܿ௜~߬௜ݏሶ௜	and	 ሶܿ௜~߬௜ሺݏ௜ െ ݏ∗௜ሻ	and	as	the	change	in	market	
price	is	determined	by	the	net	flow	of	capital	into	or	out	of	the	market,	sum	across	all	݅	to	derive	the	
following	equation	of	price	formation:		
݌ሶ ൌ ܽ෍ ሶܿ௜ ൌ ܽଵ ቆ
∑ ߬௜ݏሶ௜
∑ ߬௜ ቇ ൅ ܽଶ ቆ
∑ ߬௜ሺݏ௜ െ ݏ∗௜ሻ
∑ ߬௜ ቇ ൌ ܽଵݏሶ ൅ ܽଶሺݏ െ ݏ∗ሻ,																																																										ሺ3ሻ	
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where	 the	 constants	ܽଵ	and	ܽଶ	are	 positive	 and	 the	 constant	ݏ∗	can	 be	 of	 any	 sign.	 Equation	 (3)	
implies	 that	 the	sentiments	ݏ௜	of	 the	 investor	groups	with	various	߬௜	and	the	overall	 sentiment	ݏ	in	
the	market	are	related	by	the	formula:14		
ݏ ൌ ∑ ߬௜ݏ௜∑ ߬௜ 	.																																																																																																																																																																						ሺ4ሻ	
The	heterogeneous	market	model	is	then	given	by	the	dynamical	system:	
݌ሶ ൌ ܽଵݏሶ ൅ ܽଶሺݏ െ ݏ∗ሻ,																																																																																																																																															ሺ5ܽሻ	
߬௜ݏሶ௜ ൌ െݏ௜ ൅ tanhሺߚଵݏ௜ ൅ ߚଶ݄ሻ,						݅ ൌ 1, 2, … ,ܰ,																																																																																														ሺ5ܾሻ	
߬௛ ሶ݄ ൌ െ݄ ൅ tanhሺߢଵ݌ሶ ൅ ߢଶߦ௧ሻ,																																																																																																																															ሺ5ܿሻ	
where	the	aggregate	sentiment	ݏ	is	defined	by	(4).	













interaction	 among	 the	 investor	 groups,	 each	 continues	 to	 impact	 the	 others	 by	 eventually	






both	direct	 simulations	and	empirical	data.	Section	2.3	applies	 the	model	 to	demonstrate	 that	 the	
efficient	market	regime	occurs	on	short	timescales.	The	relevant	technical	details	are	in	Appendix	A.	
2.1.	Preliminary	analysis:	key	effects	
We	 can	 substitute	݌ሶ 	from	 (5a)	 into	 (5c)	 to	 obtain	 a	 self‐contained	 dynamical	 system	 for	ݏ௜	and	݄.	
When	making	this	substitution,	we	follow	Gusev	et	al.	(2015)	and	approximate	the	second	term	on	
the	 right‐hand	 side	 of	 (5a),	which	 describes	 the	 evolution	 of	 price	 over	 long‐term	horizons,	 by	 a	
positive	 constant	 that	 represents	 the	 growth	 rate	 of	 the	 stock	market.15	We	 obtain	 the	 following	
equations:	
߬௜ݏሶ௜ ൌ െݏ௜ ൅ tanhሺߚଵݏ௜ ൅ ߚଶ݄ሻ,						݅ ൌ 1, 2, … ,ܰ,																																																																																													ሺ6ܽሻ	
																																																													
15	First,	since	ݏ~∑ ߬௜ݏ௜	and	|ݏ௜| ൑ 1,	the	term	ܽଶሺݏ െ ݏ∗ሻ	in	(5a)	is	dominated	by	the	sentiment	of	long‐term	
investors,	that	is	ݏ௜	corresponding	to	large	߬௜.	Second,	equation	(5b)	implies	that	ݏ௜	varies	by	ܱሺ1ሻ	over	߬௜,	 i.e.	
the	 longer	 the	 investment	 horizon,	 the	 slower	 the	 sentiment	 variation	 (which	 is	 not	 unreasonable).	 Thus,	




߬௛ ሶ݄ ൌ െ݄ ൅ tanhሺߛݏሶ ൅ ߜ ൅ ߢߦ௧ሻ,																																																																																																																											ሺ6ܾሻ	
where	ݏ ൌ ∑ఛ೔௦೔∑ ఛ೔ 		 in	 accordance	with	 (4),	ߜ	is	 a	 positive	 constant	 proportional	 to	 the	 stock	market	
growth	rate,	ߛ ൌ ߢଵܽଵ	and	ߢ	is	ߢଶ	renamed.		
Equations	(6)	define	a	dynamical	system	of	ܰ ൅ 1	mutually‐coupled	nonlinear	equations.	As	we	




߬௜ݏሷ௜ ൅ ܩሺݏ௜ሻݏሶ௜ ൅ ܷ݀
ሺݏ௜ሻ
݀ݏ௜ ൌ ܨ௜
௖ ൅ ܨ௘,					݅ ൌ 1, 2, … ,ܰ,																																																																																									ሺ7ሻ	
where	ܷሺݏ௜ሻ,	ܩሺݏ௜ሻ,	ܨ௜௖	and	ܨ௘	are	given	by	equations	(A3),	(A4),	(A5)	and	(A6),	respectively.	













the	regime	relevant	for	the	stock	market	corresponds	to	ߚଵ ൌ 1.1	and	ߜ ൌ 0.03,	which	results	in	an	
asymmetric	double‐well	shape	of	the	potential	(Figure	1).16			
	
Figure	1:	 The	 profiles	 of	 the	 energy	 surface	 and	 the	 potential	well,	 corresponding	 to	ߚଵ ≳ 1	and	
ߜ ≪ 1.	(a)	The	energy	surface	ܧሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ሻ	is	shown	as	a	function	of	ݏ௜	and	ݏሶ௜	in	the	space	ሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ , ܧሻ.	The	
colors	indicate	energy	levels,	from	low	(blue)	to	high	(red).	(b)	The	potential	well	ܷሺݏ௜ሻ	is	shown	as	
a	function	of	ݏ௜.	The	equilibrium	point	at	the	cusp	of	the	potential	is	the	unstable	saddle,	while	the	
equilibrium	 points	 at	 its	 minima	 can	 be	 stable	 or	 unstable	 nodes	 or	 stable	 or	 unstable	 foci,	
depending	on	the	value	of	feedback	strength	ߛ.	The	well	where	sentiment	is	positive	is	deeper	than	
the	well	where	sentiment	is	negative.	Three	typical	trajectories	are	shown	schematically	in	the	well.	
Figure	 (1a)	 depicts	 a	 surface	 corresponding	 to	 the	 kinetic	 and	 potential	 energy	 of	 the	݅‐th	
particle	as	a	function	of	ݏ௜	and	ݏሶ௜:	ܧሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ሻ ൌ ఛ೔ଶ ݏሶ௜ଶ ൅ ܷሺݏ௜ሻ.	Its	cross‐section	by	the	plane	ሺܧ, ݏ௜ሻ	gives	
the	 shape	 of	 the	 potential	 well	 and	 by	 the	 plane	ሺܧ, ݏሶ௜ሻ	has	 the	 familiar	 parabolic	 profile	 of	 the	
																																																													
16	As	ߚଵ	increases,	the	potential	well	undergoes	a	bifurcation	from	a	single‐well	U‐shape	to	a	double‐well	






If	 the	 impacts	 of	 damping	ሺെܩݏሶ௜ሻ,	 interaction	ሺܨ௜௖ሻ	and	 news	ሺܨ௘ሻ	were	 negligible,	 a	 particle	
would	 oscillate	 periodically	 in	 response	 to	 the	 restoring	 force	െ ௗ௎ௗ௦೔	along	 the	 energy	 conserving	
trajectories,	given	by	ܧሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ሻ ൌ constant,	on	horizontal	planes.			
Let	 us	 consider	 the	 impact	 of	 damping	 on	 a	 particle’s	 motion.	 Damping,	 if	 not	 counteracted,	
causes	 the	 particle	 to	 lose	 energy,	 so	 that	 its	 path	 spirals	 down	 toward	 either	 the	 negative	 or	
positive	 stable	 equilibrium	 points	 located	 in	 the	minima	 of	ܧሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ሻ.	Momentarily	 returning	 from	
this	 analogy	 to	 the	 real	world,	we	 can	 say	 that	 the	 interaction	 among	 investors	within	 each	peer	
group,	 subject	 to	 random	 idiosyncratic	 influences,	 compels	 the	group’s	 sentiment	 toward	either	a	
negative	or	positive	equilibrium,	where	the	consensus	of	opinion	will	be	reached.		
Price	 feedback	adds	a	 fascinating	twist	to	this	dynamic.	 It	 follows	from	(A4)	that	 the	damping	
coefficient	ܩ	is	 a	 function	 of	 the	 particle’s	 position	 and	 is	 also	 dependent	 on	 several	 parameters,	
most	notably	 the	price	 feedback	 strength	ߛ.	 Interestingly,	ܩ	becomes	negative	 in	 some	 regions	on	
the	ሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ሻ‐plane	for	ߛ	exceeding	a	certain	critical	value	(equation	A7),	implying	that	for	sufficiently	
strong	feedback,	damping	begins	to	supply	energy	to	the	system	instead	of	dissipating	it.	As	a	result,	
for	 large	ߛ,	 some	or	 all	 trajectories	may	 converge	 to	 the	 limit	 cycle	 orbit	where	 the	 supplied	 and	
dissipated	 energies	 compensate	 each	 other.	 This	 yields	 a	 potentially	 new	 state	 of	 dynamic	








showed	 for	 the	 case	 where	ܰ ൌ 1	that	 subcritical	ߛ	leads	 to	 realistic	 market	 regimes.	 We	 should	
briefly	 inspect	 this	 case	 because	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 interaction	ሺܨ௖ሻ,	 the	 situation	 of	ܰ ൐ 1	is	
qualitatively	similar	to	that	of	ܰ ൌ 1	under	the	approximation	(7).		
The	case	ܰ ൌ 1	offers	a	simple	portrait	of	trajectories	as	numerical	solutions	to	equations	(6)	for	
ߦ௧ ൌ 0	on	the	ሺݏ, ݄ሻ‐plane	(Figure	2a).	The	distinct	regimes	illustrated	schematically	 in	Figure	(1b)	





the	well	 in	which	sentiment	 is	positive.	Figure	 (2b),	which	depicts	 the	empirical	 sentiment	path18	





17	The	motion	 on	 the	ሺݏ, ݄ሻ‐plane	 bears	 resemblance	 to	 the	motion	 on	 the	ሺݏ, ݏሶሻ‐plane	 because	݄	can	 be	
expressed	as	a	function	of	ݏ	and	ݏሶ 	from	equation	(6a).		
18	Following	 the	methodology	 from	Gusev	et	 al.	 (2015),	we	have	 constructed	a	 time	series	of	daily	݄ሺݐሻ	





Figure	2:	(a)	The	phase	portrait	on	the	ሺݏ, ݄ሻ‐plane	for	the	model	with	ܰ ൌ 1,	showing	an	unstable	
focus	 in	 the	 negative‐sentiment	well	 (red	 asterisk),	 a	 stable	 focus	 in	 the	 positive‐sentiment	well	
(green	 asterisk)	 and	 large‐scale	 trajectories	 crossing	 the	wells	 (from	Gusev	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 (b)	 The	
phase	 portrait	 of	 the	 empirical	 market	 sentiment	 trajectory	 (1995‐2015).	 To	make	 this	 plot,	 the	
empirical	series	of	daily	݄ሺݐሻ	and	ݏሺݐሻ	have	been	smoothed	by	a	Fourier	filter,	removing	harmonics	
with	periods	 less	 than	100	business	days.	This	path	remained	predominantly	 in	 the	positive	well,	
with	only	two	excursions	into	the	negative	well	during	the	bear	markets	of	2001‐2002	and	2008.	
Next,	we	 examine	 the	 influence	of	 the	 stochastic	 force	ܨ௘	generated	by	 the	 flow	of	 exogenous	





implies	 that	 a	 stronger	 force	 is	 needed	 to	 move	 a	 particle	 onto	 a	 path	 crossing	 from	 the	 deep	
(positive)	well	to	the	shallow	(negative)	well.	
Additionally,	owing	to	 their	 lower	 inertia,	 “light”	particles	with	small	߬௜	react	more	strongly	to	
ܨ௘	than	 “heavy”	 particles	 with	 large	߬௜.	 As	 a	 result,	 “light”	 particles	 can	 be	 expected	 to	 appear	
frequently	on	large‐scale	trajectories	high	on	the	energy	surface,	while	“heavy”	particles	are	likely	to	





Finally,	 there	are	effects	due	 to	 the	 force	ܨ௜௖	exerted	on	 the	݅‐th	particle	by	 the	other	particles	
(equation	A5).	Its	action	can	be	viewed	through	the	prism	of	constraints	imposed	on	the	motion	by	






௜݂௝ ൌ ݂൫ݏ௜, ݏሶ௜; ݏ௝, ݏሶ௝൯ ൌ arctanh
ሺݏ௜ ൅ ߬௜ݏሶ௜ሻ െ ߚଵݏ௜
arctanh൫ݏ௝ ൅ ௝߬ݏሶ௝൯ െ ߚଵݏ௝ ൌ 1,				݅ ൌ 1, 2,… ,ܰ,				݆ ൌ 1, 2, … , ܰ.																											ሺ8ሻ	





20	We	note	 that	 these	equations	constitute	ሺேିଵሻேଶ 	nontrivial	 first	 integrals	of	motion,	out	of	which	ܰ െ 1	






Acting	 together,	 the	 above‐described	 forces	 can	 generate	 diverse	 and	 complex	 dynamics.	 For	
example,	“light”	particles	may	in	response	to	negative	news	migrate	from	higher	orbits	in	the	well	to	
orbits	 in	 the	vicinity	of	 the	negative	sentiment	equilibrium	at	 the	well’s	bottom.	According	 to	 (8),	
this	change	in	the	dynamic	of	“light”	particles	will	require	that	“heavy”	particles	adapt	their	motion	
to	 synchronize	 frequencies	 and	 amplitudes.	 Should	 this	 dynamic	 persist,	 “heavy”	 particles,	which	
make	a	major	contribution	to	total	sentiment	(4),	may	cross	from	the	positive	well	into	the	negative	
well,	 tipping	 overall	 sentiment	 in	 the	market	 from	positive	 to	 negative	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 pressure	
market	price	downward.	We	will	encounter	this	scenario	of	a	bear	market	transition	in	numerical	
simulations	and	empirical	analysis	in	the	next	section.	
At	 this	 point,	 we	 wish	 to	 remind	 the	 reader	 of	 the	 main	 purpose	 of	 this	 section,	 that	 is,	 to	
develop	a	conceptual	understanding	of	the	dynamics	in	model	(6)	prior	to	submitting	it	to	the	brute	
force	 of	 numerical	 simulations.	 We	 have	 therefore	 severely	 truncated	 this	 model	 to	 isolate	 the	
forces	 acting	 on	 a	 particle	 (i.e.	 an	 investor	 group)	 in	 equation	 (7)	 and	 explored	 the	 dynamic	
stemming	 from	 each	 force	 separately.	 The	 intuition	 developed	 here	 will	 aid	 in	 untangling	 the	













We	 proceed,	 first,	 by	 considering	 only	 two	 groups	 of	 investors,	with	߬ଵ ൌ 1	business	 day	 and	
߬ଵହ ൌ 15	business	 days,	 to	 illustrate	 the	 effects	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section.	 In	 terms	 of	
oscillator	dynamics,	the	groups	with	߬ଵ	and	߬ଵହ	behave,	respectively,	as	“light”	and	“heavy”	particles	
on	the	energy	surface.		
Figure	3	depicts	 one	 simulation	 spanning	700	business	days.	The	 “light”	particle	undergoes	 a	
large‐scale	motion	high	in	the	potential	well,	covering	the	distance	between	extreme	negative	and	
extreme	 positive	 sentiment	 values	 in	 a	 1‐2	 week	 timeframe.	 However,	 this	 particle	 can	 also	 get	













Figure	 3:	 Sentiment	 evolution	 in	 the	 two‐component	 theoretical	 model	 with	߬௜ ൌ 1,	 15.	 Other	









well	 in	 the	 interval	 300‐400	 days.	 Visually,	 it	 appears	 as	 if	 the	 “light”	 particle	 pulls	 the	 “heavy”	
particle	 across	 the	 wells.	 As	 we	 will	 see	 below,	 this	 is	 the	 basic	 characteristic	 of	 the	 cascade	
mechanism	governing	regime	transitions	between	bull‐	and	bear	markets.				
Let	 us	 now	 discuss	 the	 results	 of	 simulations	 in	 a	more	 realistic	model	 that	 consists	 of	 nine	
investor	 groups	 with	τ୧ ൌ	1,	 2,	 3,	 4,	 11,	 15,	 19,	 24,	 28,	 which	 will	 be	 applied	 to	 design	 trading	
strategies	 in	Section	3.	 Figure	4	 shows	 sentiment	evolution	 for	 four	groups	with	߬௜ ൌ	1,	3,	11,	19.	
The	synchronicity	among	these	groups	is	evident.	For	example,	in	the	interval	750‐800	days	we	can	
observe	how	the	move	of	the	group	with	߬௜ ൌ	1	from	the	negative	to	positive	well	causes	a	similar	
move	of	 the	group	with	߬௜ ൌ	3,	 followed	by	 the	group	with	߬௜ ൌ	4	and	then	 the	rest	of	 the	groups,	
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19,	24,	28.	Other	parameters:	ߚଵ ൌ 1.1,	ߚଶ ൌ 1.0,	ߜ ൌ 0.02,	߬௛ ൌ 1,	ߛ ൌ 10.		
Another	 pattern	 discernable	 in	 this	 figure	 is	 that	 the	 particles	 form	 two	 groups	with	 distinct	
dynamics:	the	first	group	with	߬௜ ൌ	1,	3	that	follows	a	typical	“light”	particle	dynamic	and	the	second	
group	 with	߬௜ ൌ	11,	 19	 that	 behaves	 like	 a	 typical	 “heavy”	 particle.	 This	 separation	 implies	 a	
relatively	 sharp	 transition	 between	 the	 two	 dynamics	 as	 a	 function	 of	 the	 investment	 horizon	߬௜.	
Therefore,	for	a	qualitative	analysis,	 it	seems	justified	to	approximate	interaction	in	the	market	as	
the	interaction	between	two	types	of	participants:	volatile	short‐term	investors	who	are	sensitive	to	
incoming	 information	 and	 relatively‐static	 long‐term	 investors	 whose	 views	 on	 the	 market	 are	
firmly	established.	 It	 is	 interesting	 that	both	groups	are	vital	 to	market	dynamics	since	 the	short‐
																																																													








At	 this	 juncture,	we	 can	 test	 the	model	with	 empirical	 data	 for	 the	US	 stock	market	 between	
1995‐2015,	 using	 the	model	with	 the	 nine	 components,	 studied	 above,	 to	 obtain	 daily	ݏ௜ሺݐሻ	from	
measured	daily	݄ሺݐሻ.	Figure	5	shows	the	results	for	the	period	2005‐2009,	chosen	to	highlight	the	
empirical	 behavior	 of	 sentiment	 during	 transition	 to‐	 and	 from	 the	 bear	 market	 regime.	 These	
results	are	visually	similar	to	the	results	of	numerical	simulation.	We	particularly	note	the	cascade	
mechanism	of	the	market	regime	transitions	and	the	distinct	patterns	in	the	behavior	of	the	short‐




24,	28.	Other	parameters:	ߚଵ ൌ 1.1,	ߚଶ ൌ 1.0.		
																																																													
24	Incidentally,	there	appear	certain	parallels	between	the	behavior	of	these	two	investor	groups	and	the	





In	 this	 section	we	 show	 that	 in	 the	 leading	 order	 the	dynamic	 of	 short‐term	 investors	 decouples	
from	the	dynamics	of	investor	groups	with	longer	horizons,	where	short‐term	investors	are	defined	
as	 traders	 operating	 on	 timescales	 much	 shorter	 than	߬௛~1	day.	 In	 particular,	 we	 will	 see	 that	
investment	processes	on	these	timescales	are	not	involved	in	the	feedback	mechanism,	but	instead	
cause	market	price	to	adjust	quickly	to	new	information,	contributing	to	market	efficiency.		
Let	us	consider	a	two‐component	25	system	(6)	such	that	߬ଵ ≪ ߬௛ ≲ ߬ଶ:	
߬ଵݏሶଵ ൌ െݏଵ ൅ tanhሺߚଵݏଵ ൅ ߚଶ݄ሻ,																																																																																																																											 ሺ9ܽሻ	
߬ଶݏሶଶ ൌ െݏଶ ൅ tanhሺߚଵݏଶ ൅ ߚଶ݄ሻ,																																																																																																																										ሺ9ܾሻ	
߬௛ ሶ݄ ൌ െ݄ ൅ tanhሺ̅ߛሺ߬ଵݏሶଵ ൅ ߬ଶݏሶଶሻ ൅ ߜ ൅ ߢߦ௧ሻ,																																																																																																			ሺ9ܿሻ	
where	̅ߛ ൌ ఊఛభାఛమ	.	
We	first	examine	this	system	on	timescales	~߬ଵ.	It	follows	from	(9a)	that	ݏଵ	can	change	by	ܱሺ1ሻ	

















߬ଶݏሶଶ ൌ െݏଶ ൅ tanhሺߚଵݏଶ ൅ ߚଶ݄ሻ,																																																																																																																								ሺ11ܾሻ	


















with	߬ଵ ൌ 0.01	and	߬ଶ ൌ 25.	 Sentiment	ݏଵ	falls	 on	 the	 isocline	 along	 the	 approximately	 horizontal	
lines:	the	motion	occurring	so	fast	that	݄	has	 little	time	to	change.	Sentiment	ݏଵ	continues	to	move	
along	the	 isocline,	 following	slowly	evolving	݄.	The	segment	of	the	 isocline	between	 its	extrema	is	
unstable,	which	 causes	 sentiment	 to	 vacillate	 between	 the	 isocline’s	 left	 and	 right	 branches.	 The	
overall	motion	 consists	 of	 slow	passages	 along	 the	 isocline	 and	 fast	 jumps	 between	 its	 branches,	
determined	solely	by	the	dynamics	between	݄	and	ݏଶ.		
Thus,	 we	 have	 shown	 that	 sentiment	ݏଵ,	 which	 develops	 on	 timescales	߬ଵ ≪ 1	day,	 decouples	
from	 the	 system’s	 dynamics	 and	 does	 not	 participate	 in	 the	 sentiment‐information	 feedback;	
instead,	 sentiment	ݏଵ	resides	 in	 a	 state	 of	 approximate	 equilibrium,28	adjusting	 instantaneously	 to	
changes	in	information	flow	݄	and	so	driving	corresponding	changes	in	market	price.	We	therefore	
conclude	 that	 market	 efficiency	 persists	 on	 timescales	 much	 less	 than	 one	 day.	 Further,	 we	 can	
																																																													
28	This	analytical	result,	which	follows	from	equations	(10)	and	(11),	has	been	verified	by	direct	numerical	




























Figure	7:	 Daily	 time	 series	 of	 information	݄ሺݐሻ,	 sentiment	ݏሺݐሻ	and	 price	݌ሺݐሻ	from	1995	 to	 2015,	
where	ݏሺݐሻ	and	݌ሺݐሻ	have	been	obtained	from	measured	݄ሺݐሻ,	using	the	nine‐component	model	(5b)	
with	߬௜ ൌ	1,	2,	3,	4,	11,	15,	19,	24,	28	and	ߚଵ ൌ 1.1,	ߚଶ ൌ 1.0,	and	the	price	formation	equation	(5a)	
with	ܽଵ ൌ 0.368,	ܽଶ ൌ 0.003,	ݏ∗ ൌ 0.126	and	 the	 integration	constant	 equal	 to	3.790.	As	mentioned	
earlier,	݄ሺݐሻ	has	been	extracted	from	news	data	in	the	DJ/Factiva	archive,	applying	the	methodology	
in	Gusev	et	al.	(2015).	SPDR	S&P	500	ETF	is	taken	as	an	investable	proxy	of	the	S&P	500	Index	in	(c).	
The	 approach	 to	 constructing	 strategies	 is	 as	 follows.	 In	 accordance	with	 (5a)	 and	 (4),	 price	
changes	are	determined	by	 the	sentiments	of	 investor	groups	with	different	 investment	horizons,	
which	 contribute	 to	 the	 formation	of	aggregate	market	 sentiment	on	different	 timescales.	Thus,	 if	
we	 extract	 the	 characteristic	 sentiment	 dynamic	 pertaining	 to	 each	 group,	we	 can	 forecast	 price	
over	multiple	time	horizons	and	implement	trades	based	upon	these	forecasts.	







projected	on	the	ሺ݄, ݏ௜ሻ‐plane,	subject	to	constraints	imposed	on	ݏ௜	by	ݏ௝	ሺ݆ ് ݅ሻ.		
In	practice,	the	nine‐component	model	(5)	with	߬௜ ൌ	1,	2,	3,	4,	11,	15,	19,	24,	28	has	been	applied	
to	produce	return	forecasts	over	time	horizons	corresponding	to	the	characteristic	timescales	in	the	
model.	 These	 forecasts	 can	 form	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 number	 of	 trading	 strategies,	 four	 of	which,	with	
different	 holding	 periods,	 are	 presented	 here.	 Specifically,	 we	 show	 one	 strategy	 based	 on	 the	
shortest	forecast,	two	strategies	based	on	different	combinations	of	the	equally‐weighted	forecasts	
and	 the	 last	 strategy	 based	 on	 the	 longest	 forecast.	 In	 the	 backtest	 results,	 the	 average	 holding	
periods	of	these	strategies	have	been,	respectively,	around	9,	12,	25	and	45	business	days	(Table	I).	
Each	strategy	generates	daily	a	buy‐,	sell‐	or	hold	signal	on	the	SPDR	S&P	500	ETF	(Bloomberg	
ticker:	 SPY),	 an	 exchange‐traded	 fund	 tracking	 the	 S&P	 500	 Index,	 such	 that	 today’s	 trading	
instruction	is	applied	to	the	next	day’s	opening	price.	The	signal	has	no	price	input:	it	is	based	solely	
on	the	forecast	derived	from	news.	We	emphasize	that	these	strategies	are	merely	crude	prototypes,	
designed	not	 for	actual	 trading	but	 to	verify	return	predictability;	as	such,	 these	strategies	do	not	
include	position	sizing	and	risk	management.		
These	strategies	have	been	backtested	over	the	period	1995‐2015.	Since	the	strategies	require	































Strategy	1	 17.5	 14.9 1.17 1.471 0.011	 8.6	
Strategy	2	 18.7	 15.1 1.24 1.299 0.302	 12.0	
Strategy	3	 20.8	 13.7 1.52 1.456 0.324	 25.3	
Strategy	4	 18.3	 14.0 1.30 1.453 0.084	 44.6	
Mom‐Rev	 9.8	 9.4 1.04 0.857 ‐0.034	 3.8	














Strategy	1	 100	 79 62 35 30	 1	
Strategy	2	 79	 100 82 45 23	 29	
Strategy	3	 62	 82 100 65 25	 34	
Strategy	4	 35	 45 65 100 13	 9	
Mom‐Rev	 30	 23 25 13 100	 ‐5	




exhibited	 a	 relatively	 low	 correlation	 with	 these	 benchmarks	 on	 the	 12‐year	 out‐sample	 period.	
Note	that	the	lengths	of	the	average	holding	periods	of	the	news‐based	strategies	are	substantially	
longer	 than	 that	 of	 the	 active	 benchmark.	 These	 results	 point	 toward	 return	 predictability	 and	
indicate	that	the	model	has,	at	least	partially,	captured	this	predictability.		
4.	Discussion		
The	 starting	 point	 for	 this	 paper	was	 the	 stock	market	model	 in	 Gusev	 et	 al.	 (2015).	 The	model	
consists	 of	 analysts29,	who	extract	 relevant	 information	 from	price	 changes	 and	 exogenous	news,	










The	above	assumption	on	the	 interaction	topology	in	the	model	 is	 instrumental	for	identifying	
the	basic	mechanisms	that	drive	market	dynamics;	however	it	also	makes	the	model	 insufficiently	
fine‐grained	 for	 testing	return	predictability.	An	 introduction	of	a	more	complex	topology	 is	not	a	
straightforward	task,	mainly	for	the	lack	of	obvious	choices	and	because	of	the	sensitivity	of	model’s	
properties	 to	 the	 topology,	 but	 also	 because	 an	 unnecessary	 complexity	 may	 rather	 impede	





that	 despite	 the	 absence	 of	 interaction	 across	 the	 networks,	 each	 still	 can	 impact	 the	 others	 by	






one	 day	 (Section	 2.2).	 The	model	 equations	 reveal	 that	 it	 is	 price	 feedback	 that	 enforces	market	
inefficiency	by	coupling	the	endogenous	variables.	We	have	shown	that	feedback	is	negligible	on	the	





nature.	 Fluid	 dynamics	 provides	 an	 instructive	 example.	 In	 fluids,	 inertia	 plays	 a	 central	 role	 on	
large	 scales,	 while	 viscous	 damping	 is	 dominant	 on	 small	 scales.30	As	 a	 result,	 the	 large‐scale	








these	 investors	 react	 so	 fast	 as	 to	 move	 prices	 almost	 instantaneously	 in	 response	 to	 new	
information,	leading	to	an	(adiabatic)	equilibrium	regime	on	these	timescales	(Section	2.3).	On	the	
contrary,	 inertia	 cannot	 be	 neglected	 on	 longer	 timescales,	 which	 results	 in	 effective	 interaction	
between	investors	and	analysts	in	the	model,	yielding	complex	dynamics	characterized	by	nonlinear	
feedback	(Section	2.2).		









aggregation,	 analysis,	 editing)	 and	 distribution	 frequency,	 creates	 a	 window	 of	 opportunity	 for	
intraday	trading	between	the	occurrence	of	a	news	event	(e.g.	the	release	of	an	earnings	report)	and	
its	reflection	in	݄.		
This	 short‐term	price	 reaction	 to	 information	 released	 by	 analysts	 is	 incomplete	 because	 the	
overall	market	 sentiment	also	 includes	 the	 sentiments	of	 investor	 groups	with	 longer	 investment	
horizons,	which	 can	 influence	 the	mid‐	 and	 long‐term	price	 evolution.	Equations	 (6)	 imply	 that	 a	
change	in	information	will	cause	changes	in	sentiment	on	many	different	timescales	and	that	these	
changes	will	 in	turn	cause	changes	 in	 information	–	creating	a	 feedback	 loop.	This	complex	multi‐
scale	 interplay	 between	 information	 and	 sentiment	 is	 the	 generator	 of	 the	 variety	 in	 market	









time	 series	 of	 information	 and	 sentiment	 and	 applied	 model	 (5)	 to	 forecast	 market	 price	 and	
develop	the	prototypes	of	trading	strategies.	The	backtested	results,	compared	to	passive	and	active	
benchmarks,	 suggest	 that	market	 forecasting	 on	 the	 above‐described	 principles	 functions	with	 a	




In	 this	 paper,	we	 have	 sought	 to	 develop	 a	market	model	 that	 is	 sufficiently	 sophisticated	 to	
both	replicate	past	performance	and	predict	future	returns,	while	being	tractable	to	highlight	some	















than	one	day,	 the	market	behaves	 efficiently	with	 respect	 to	processing	 information.	On	 time	
horizons	longer	than	one	day,	the	market	becomes	inefficient.	







4. According	to	this	model,	 the	sentiments	of	 investor	groups	with	different	 investment	horizons	
collectively	 form	 aggregate	 investor	 opinion	 that	 determines	 a	 price	 dynamic,	 which	 in	 turn	
influences	information	flow	acting	on	all	groups	participating	in	the	market.		
5. This	common	information	flow	provides	a	link	through	which	the	sentiments	of	investor	groups	
are	 mutually	 coupled.	 As	 such,	 information	 induces	 self‐similar	 dynamics	 among	 investor	
groups	on	different	timescales	through	synchronization,	leading	to	complex	self‐similar	patterns	
observable	in	market	behavior.		
6. These	 investor	 groups	 form	 two	 classes	 characterized	 by	 distinct	 dynamics.	 The	 first	 class	
contains	 investors	 with	 horizons	 less	 than	 one	 week.	 Their	 average	 sentiments	 are	 typically	
volatile,	 oscillating	 between	 negative	 and	 positive	 values	 in	 the	 timeframe	 from	 roughly	 one	
week	to	one	month.	The	second	class	consists	of	 investors	with	horizons	exceeding	one	week.	
Their	 average	 sentiments	 primarily	 undergo	 small‐amplitude	 oscillations	 around	 either	 a	
positive	or	negative	equilibrium,	where	the	consensus	of	opinion	is	reached.			
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߬௜ݏሷ௜ ൌ ߔሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ , ݏሶ , ߦ௧ሻ
ൌ െݏሶ௜ ൅ ሺ1 െ ሺݏ௜ ൅ ߬௜ݏሶ௜ሻଶሻ ൬ߚଵݏሶ௜ ൅ ߚଵ߬௛ ݏ௜ െ
1
߬௛ arctanhሺݏ௜ ൅ ߬௜ݏሶ௜ሻ൰
൅ ሺ1 െ ሺݏ௜ ൅ ߬௜ݏሶ௜ሻଶሻ ߚଶ߬௛ tanhሺߛݏሶ ൅ ߜ ൅ ߢߦ௧ሻ ,					݅ ൌ 1, 2, … ,ܰ,																																									ሺܣ1ሻ	
where	ݏ ൌ ∑ఛ೔௦೔∑ ఛ೔ 		in	accordance	with	(4).		
These	 equations	 govern	 the	motion	 of	ܰ	oscillators,	 that	 is	ܰ	particles	with	 the	 coordinates	ݏ௜	
and	the	velocities	ݏሶ௜ ,	subjected	to	the	force	ߔሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ , ݏሶ , ߦ௧ሻ.	Note	that	߬௜	is	analogous	to	the	mass	of	the	
݅‐th	particle	in	the	sense	that	the	impact	of	a	force	on	the	particles	with	small	߬௜	(“light”	particles)	is	
																																																													







The	 first	 two	 terms	 in	ߔሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ , ݏሶ , ߦ௧ሻ	contain	 the	 restoring	 and	 damping	 force	 components	
responsible	for	autonomous	dynamics.	The	third	term	describes	the	force	originating	from	the	݅‐th	
sentiment	 component	 feedback	 (~ߛ߬௜ݏሶ௜	and	~ߜ)	 and	 the	 external	 forces	 exerted	 by	 the	 other	
particles	(~ߛ ∑ ௝߬ݏሶ௝௝ஷ௜ )	and	by	the	flow	of	exogenous	news	(~ߢߦ௧)	in	the	argument	of	the	hyperbolic	
tangent.	Being	dependent	on	position	and	velocity,	these	forces	vary	along	a	particle’s	trajectory.			
For	illustration	purposes,	we	expand	ߔሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ , ݏሶ , ߦ௧ሻ	into	a	truncated	Taylor	series	to	separate	the	
above‐mentioned	force	components	and	write	equation	(A1)	in	a	“canonical”	form:	
߬௜ݏሷ௜ ൅ ܩሺݏ௜ሻݏሶ௜ ൅ ܷ݀
ሺݏ௜ሻ
݀ݏ௜ ൌ ܨ௜
௖ ൅ ܨ௘,					݅ ൌ 1, 2, … ,ܰ.																																																																																							ሺܣ2ሻ	
In	 this	 equation,	ܷሺݏ௜ሻ	has	 the	meaning	 of	 a	 potential	 and	 is	 given	with	 the	 precision	 up	 to	 a	
constant	by	
ܷሺݏ௜ሻ ൌ 1߬௛ ቌ
ߚଵ െ 23
4 ݏ௜
ସ െ ߚଵ െ 12 ݏ௜
ଶ െ ߚଶߜݏ௜ቍ ;																																																																																															ሺܣ3ሻ	
ܩሺݏ௜ሻ	has	the	meaning	of	a	damping	coefficient	and	is	given	by		




߬௛ ߜݏ௜ ൅ ൬ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ̅ߛ
߬௜














ܨ௘ ൌ ߚଶ߬௛ ߢߦ௧.																																																																																																																																																																	ሺܣ6ሻ	
As	 such,	 equation	 (A2)	 describes	 the	 motion	 of	 a	 particle	 inside	 an	 asymmetric	 W‐shaped	
potential	well	(A3)	for	ߚଵ ൐ 1	(see	Figure	1)	in	the	presence	of	nonlinear	damping	(A4),	driven	by	
the	 forces	 generated	 through	 interaction	 between	 particles	 (A5)	 and	 through	 the	 impact	 of	
exogenous	news	 (A6).	Note	 that	 the	 feedback	 force	 in	 (A1),	 proportional	 to	̅ߛ߬௜ݏሶ௜	and	ߜ,	 has	 been	
incorporated	 into	 the	potential	 force	(only	 the	component	~ߜ)	and	 into	 the	damping	 force	on	 the	
left‐hand	side	of	(A2).	
To	 obtain	 equations	 (A2)‐(A6),	 we	 have	 truncated	 the	 Taylor	 series	 of	ߔሺݏ௜, ݏሶ௜ , ݏሶ , ߦ௧ሻ	at	 terms	
above	cubic	in	ݏ௜,	linear	in	ݏሶ௜	and	linear	in	ߜ	and	have	kept	only	the	leading	terms	in	the	expressions	
for	 the	 forces	ܨ௜௖	and	ܨ௘.	 Consequently,	 these	 equations	 are,	 strictly	 speaking,	 only	 valid	 in	 the	
region	 where	|ݏ௜| ≪ 1	and	|ݏሶ௜| ≪ 1.	 However,	 we	 expect	 that	 the	 formula	 for	 the	 potential	ܷሺݏ௜ሻ,	
which	 does	 not	 contain	 the	 heavily	 truncated	 terms	~ݏሶ௜ ,	 holds	 reasonably	 well	 for	 all	 sentiment	
values	(|ݏ௜| ൑ 1)	within	the	relevant	range	of	parameter	values,	namely	ߚଵ~1, ߚଶ~1	and	ߜ ≪ 1.		
As	follows	from	(A4),	the	damping	coefficient	ܩሺݏ௜ሻ	is	negative	if		
̅ߛ ൐ ̅ߛ௖ሺݏ௜, ߬௜ሻ ൌ
ቀ1 െ ߚଵ ൅ ߬௜߬௛ቁ ൅ 2ߚଶ
߬௜߬௛ ߜݏ௜ ൅ ቀߚଵ ൅ 2ሺߚଵ െ 1ሻ
߬௜߬௛ቁ ݏ௜
ଶ
ߚଶ ߬௜߬௛ ሺ1 െ ݏ௜
ଶሻ .																																																			ሺܣ7ሻ	




has	 been	 derived	 for	|ݏ௜| ≪ 1	and	ߜ ≪ 1,	 we	 can	 in	 the	 leading	 order	 neglect	 the	 terms	~ߜݏ௜	and	
~ݏ௜ଶ	to	obtain			
ߛ ൐ ߛ௖ሺ߬௜ሻ ൌ
1 െ ሺߚଵ െ 1ሻ ߬௛߬௜
ߚଶ ෍߬௜ .																																																																																																																					ሺܣ8ሻ	
Since	ߚଵ~1	(we	use	ߚଵ ൌ 1.1),	 the	 second	 term	 in	 the	numerator	 in	 (A8)	 is	much	 smaller	 than	
unity	 for	 particles	 with	߬௜ ൒ ߬௛	(we	 set	߬௛ ൌ 1	day)	 and	 can	 be	 neglected.	 This	 means	 that	ߛ௖	has	
approximately	the	same	value	for	all	investors	with	investment	horizons	equal	to	or	longer	than	one	
day,	given	by	
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